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Abstract 
Access to medicines is an important health policy issue. This study analyses the demand for 
medicines in low-income countries from the perspective of the prices paid by public authorities. The 
analysis draws on World Health Organization (WHO) and Health Action International (HAI) 2006 
data on procurement prices of medicines across 16 low-income countries covering 48 branded drugs 
and 18 therapeutic categories. Variation in prices, the mark-ups over marginal costs and estimation 
of price elasticities allows assessment of whether these elasticities are correlated with a country’s 
national income. Using the Ramsey pricing rule, the study’s findings suggest that substantial cross-
country variation in prices and mark-ups exist, with price elasticities ranging from -1 to -2, which are 
weakly correlated with national income. Government demand for medicines thus appears to be price 
elastic, raising important policy implications aimed at improving access to medicines for patients in 
low-income countries.  
 
Keywords: medicines, low-income countries, pharmaceutical policy, health policy, government 
procurement 
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Introduction 
 
Access to medicines is an important health policy issue. This paper considers demand structures in a 
selection of low-income countries from the perspective of public authorities to aid understanding of 
the issue of access to medicines. Analysis of the demand for medicines in low-income countries is 
critical for effective pharmaceutical policy where regulation is less developed, health systems are 
cash constrained and medicines are not typically subsidised by a public health insurance system.  
 
The standard economic approach for measuring demand for a commodity is to calculate price 
elasticities, which requires data on prices and volumes. Unfortunately low-income countries, in 
general, do not have robust data on prices and the quantities of medicines consumed. The estimation 
of price elasticities through conventional approaches is generally not possible and therefore, 
consequently there is little evidence on the price responsiveness either at the patient level or at the 
level of sales to government purchasers. There is, in short, a gap in basic empirical evidence that 
arises through an acute lack of data. Recent health related surveys have only begun to collect 
information on medicine prices but volume information is still lacking in many low-income 
countries. 
 
For this study information on procurement prices was accessible but, as is typically the case, volume 
information for sales to government purchasers was not available. This data constraint limits the 
ability of policy makers to assess the impact that price regulation may have on the up-take and access 
to medicines. To overcome the lack of volume information, information on prices and proxy 
estimates of price-cost mark-ups were used in conjunction with the general Ramsey formula to 
surmount these data restrictions and calculate the responsiveness of demand to product price. The 
use of Ramsey formula, allows demand responsiveness to be back-calculated as it is based on price-
cost mark-ups, expressed as a fraction of price, being inversely related to their demand elasticities 
(Ramsey 1927).  
 
Ramsey (1927) developed the model to allow the pubic regulator to determine the optimal level of 
taxation of commodities to generate revenue, while trying to address distortions in the market. 
According to the Ramsey rule, a least distortionary tax is one where the tax is greatest on inelastic 
demands as this raises the consumer borne price over the marginal cost in inverse proportion to the 
elasticity of demand. The Ramsey pricing formula, commonly referred to as the inverse-elasticity 
rule, is: 
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mark-up over price, and λ is a constant (normally reflecting a total revenue constraint in general 
application). Below we use the inverse elasticity rule to back-calculate price elasticities for publicly 
procured pharmaceutical products in a sample of low-income countries where volume data were not 
available. Before turning to this we give some background on the global pharmaceutical sector. 
 
A key issue in understanding the demand for medicines relates to the features of the pharmaceutical 
market and how prices are set. Due to the patenting of medicines, markets are characterised by the 
presence of a monopoly element. From the perspective of the firm, the pricing rules for a monopolist 
according to economic theory would see price set well above marginal cost.  
 
Since prices of medicines in high-income countries would be unaffordable for low-income countries, 
the Ramsey pricing rule has been proposed as a potential policy response for low-income countries 
(WTO and WHO 2001). According to this rule, prices should be closer to marginal cost where the 
demand for medicines is more sensitive to price. Where demand is not sensitive to the medicine’s 
price, that is when demand is inelastic, then price could be set at high levels to cross-subsidise low-
income markets. From the firm’s perspective, if country markets are well segmented, intellectual 
property rights (IPRs) are protected globally and there is little threat of parallel trade or leakage into 
other country markets, Ramsey pricing could be used to establish affordability in different market 
environments. To implement Ramsey pricing however, the firm, requires adequate information about 
demand. Where such information is not forthcoming it has been proposed that a country’s income 
could be used as a proxy for a country’s price elasticity within the Ramsey approach to setting 
procurement prices in low-income countries (Danzon and Towse 2003).   
 
The pharmaceutical industry is a global business and such cross-subsidisation strategies are an 
attractive mechanism to allow market exploitation across individual countries. Global sales in 2011 
show that high-income regions such as North America (36%), Europe (24%) and Japan (12%) 
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account for 72% of total pharmaceutical spending; branded drugs account for 63% of total 
pharmaceutical spending, but this is expected to decline as product development wanes and patents 
on existing products expire, leading to a rise in generic drug spending (IMS Institute for Healthcare 
Informatics 2012). The pharmaceutical market is characterised as having high fixed costs, which 
may or may not be exclusively attributable to Research and Development (R&D). The costs involved 
in developing, producing and marketing a drug can be categorised depending on where they are 
incurred and whether they vary with the volume of sales and/or the countries in which the drugs are 
sold (OFT 2007). Some evidence suggests the average expenditure on R&D alone is $802 million 
per approved new drug (DiMasi, Hansen et al. 2003). R&D is considered an international activity (in 
other words a fixed cost relative to the global market) because it can be located anywhere in the 
world and once the drug is developed, R&D expense is a sunk cost (OFT 2007). The remaining 
market access costs are specific to the country of sale and include distribution costs, marketing costs 
and interactions with government authorities for pricing and reimbursement negotiations (OFT 
2007). 
 
These features of the pharmaceutical market highlight the important relationship between the 
pharmaceutical industry and the individual country regulators that purchase drugs on behalf of their 
population. High-income countries generate larger sales for the pharmaceutical industry with respect 
to volume and also have a higher degree of market power as a monopsonist when negotiating with 
firms due to the potentially high profit stream available in that country. Low-income countries are 
cash constrained, do not reflect high profit markets and as a result, do not have the same degree of 
buyer power in price negotiations.  
 
It is also important to note that the definition of pharmaceutical prices depends on where they occur 
in the supply chain (e.g. ex-manufacturer, or patient retail price). This study draws on upstream 
prices. Empirical work has commonly used upstream prices, such as ex-manufacturer prices, and 
country level measures of income to examine the variation in pharmaceutical prices (Schut and van 
Bergeijk 1986; Scherer and Watal 2001; Danzon and Furukawa 2003; Rojas 2005; Danzon and 
Furukawa 2008). Schut and van Bergeijk (1986) found that besides per capita income, regulation 
played a critical role in explaining global price variation. Direct price control measures were found to 
result in an average 20% price reduction. Policies such as procurement through a central government 
agency, and promotion of generics also contributed to lowering the general price level of 
pharmaceuticals. Scherer and Watal (2001) found that per capita income helped to explain global 
price differences, but that this relationship weakened over time as the pharmaceutical firms offered 
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discounts within individual countries that were unrelated to per capita income. Danzon and 
Furukawa (2003; 2008) found a relationship between price and income in high-income countries 
only. In less affluent countries, for example in Latin America, high drug prices appear to partly 
reflect the skewed income distribution of income and the manufacturer’s tendency to target prices to 
the affluent minority, while overall drug prices remain unaffordable for the majority population, 
contributing to a lower per capita use of drugs in these countries. Descriptive analysis has also found 
differences in prices for the same drug across countries with similar income levels 
(Balasubramaniam 1996; Myhr 2000; Maskus 2001) and within countries (Pitaknetinan 1999). The 
vast majority of the literature has thus concentrated on the relationship observed across readily 
available data on price and income. 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide complementary evidence on the pattern of demand in low-income 
countries through the estimation of price elasticities. The study uses government procurement 
(upstream) price data at the molecule level drawing on a large cross-sectional sample of low-income 
countries. The study has three objectives: to explore the variation in pharmaceutical prices and price 
mark-ups across low-income countries; to investigate the price sensitivity at the government level 
and compute price elasticities for sales to government purchasers; and to analyse the relationship 
between these estimated price elasticities and income.  
 
Methods 
 
The empirical approach to calculate price elasticities draws on price information only because 
volume information was unavailable – as is commonly the case. The analysis adopted the 
formulation of Ramsey pricing given as:  
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where 
jε−
1
 is the inverse elasticity of demand, the procurement pack price of the branded medicine 
is Pj for medicine j, and MCj is the marginal production cost for product j. A true estimate of the 
marginal cost (MCj) of producing a given drug is not available so the pack price of available generic 
substitute medicine was used as a proxy estimate of the marginal cost.  
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The model assumes that pharmaceutical firms are profit maximisers, they have fixed costs, break 
even (hence the inverse elasticity formula has no constant in the numerator on the right hand side of 
(2), and our back-calculations are lower end estimates), and marginal costs are not zero. The model 
further assumes that cross-price elasticities for branded products are zero, and that there are no 
perfect complements. It is also assumed that for branded products there remains a monopoly element, 
that price is related to demand and that firms are aware of product price-cost mark-ups.  
 
The left hand side of equation (2) estimates the differences between price and marginal cost as a 
fraction of price. According to the Ramsey pricing rule, the left hand side of the equation should be 
inversely related to the demand elasticity. Prices were kept at the presentation level to provide price 
elasticity estimates at the molecule level. Given our assumptions, the Ramsey pricing formula allows 
back-calculation of the demand price elasticities; the measure reflects a lower bound of this 
elasticity. 
 
Data and variables 
 
The dataset comes from the World Health Organization (WHO) and Health Action International 
(HAI) database for one year, 2003 (WHO/HAI 2006). The price information covers 18 therapeutic 
areas and 48 branded drugs in 16 countries: China (sampled in Shandong and Shanghai), Jordan; 
Kazakhstan; Kuwait; Kyrgyzstan; Lebanon; Malaysia; Morocco; Nigeria; Pakistan; Peru; 
Philippines; South Africa (region of Kwa-Zulu-Natal) ; Syria; Tunisia; and Uganda. Government 
procurement price for the originator branded drug in each country is used. All prices were provided 
in US dollars for the year 2003. 
 
Procurement prices are the prices that governments and other central purchasers pay to procure 
medicines, and are generally obtained through a tendering process. The procurement prices for the 
public sector are either collected in the administrative centre (procurement offices or central medical 
stores). In a few situations, the procurement prices included local taxes and handling charges 
(WHO/HAI 2006).The data on procurement come from central or regional authorities or the Ministry 
of Health for 9 out of the 16 countries. Four out of the 16 countries used a combination of data from 
both procurement authorities and government affiliated public hospitals, while the remaining four 
collected procurement data from either government hospitals, or tenders from wholesalers. 
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Prices for each country are presented as the median price at the presentation level: drug molecule 
name; pack size and strength. The 18 therapeutic areas and 48 drugs covered are: antacids (2); 
antibiotics (6); antifungal (3); antihistamine (1); anti-infective (1); anti-inflammatory (2); anti-
parasitic (2); antiviral (4); asthma (2); cardiovascular disease (14); contraceptive (1); diabetes (3); 
and nervous system disorders (7). The top therapeutic categories with the most number of 
observations, (17 for antihypertensives and antibiotics; 15 for epileptic drugs), are found in Table 1. 
 
Table 1- Summary of drug data 
Molecule name Therapeutic category Observations Dose Countries 
     
Carbamazepine Epilepsy 8 
 
200 mg 
China, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Malaysia, Morocco, 
Philippines, Syria 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic 7 
 
1 g 
China, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Philippines, 
South Africa 
Salbutamol Asthma 7 0.1 mg China, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Morocco, Tunisia, Uganda 
Fluoxetine Antidepressant 6 20 mg China, Jordan, Malaysia, Philippines, Tunisia 
Metformin Diabetes 6 500 mg China, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines 
Aciclovir Antiviral 5 200 mg Jordan, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Syria, Tunisia 
Amitriptyline Antidepressant 5 25 mg Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia 
Captopril Antihypertensive 5 25 mg Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, Philippines 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic 5 
 
500 mg 
Kazakhstan, Morocco, Nigeria, Philippines, South 
Africa 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory 5 25 mg China, Kazakhstan, Morocco, Philippines, Syria 
Phenytoin Epilepsy 5 100 mg Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Malaysia, Tunisia 
Beclometasone Asthma 4 50 mcg China, Morocco, Peru 
Diazepam Anxiolytic 4 5 mg Jordan, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia 
Losartan Antihypertensive 4 50 mg China, Kazakhstan, Malaysia 
Omeprazole Antacid 4 20 mg China, Philippines, South Africa 
Ranitidine Antacid 4 150 mg Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Philippines,Syria 
Fluconazole Antifungal 3 200 mg South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda 
Fluphenazine Antipsychotic 3 25 mg Jordan, Morocco, Peru 
Indinavir Antiviral 3 400 mg Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco 
Loratadine Antihistamine 3 10 mg China, Malaysia, Syria 
Simvastatin Lipid lowering 3 20 mg China, Jordan, Malaysia 
Zidovudine Antiviral 3 100 mg Lebanon, Malaysia, Morocco 
Amlodipine 
Calcium channel 
blocker 2 
 
5 mg China, Malaysia 
Atenolol Antihypertensive 2 50 mg Philippines, Syria 
Co-trimoxazole Antibiotic 2 8 + 40mg/ml Syria, Tunisia 
Fluconazole Antifungal 2 150 mg Jordan, Kazakhstan 
Furosemide Diueretic 2 40 mg Jordan, Philippines 
Mebendazole Antiparasitic 2 100 mg Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
Metronidazole Antiparasitic 2 500 mg Philippines, Syria 
Nevirapine Antiviral 2 200 mg Lebanon, Morocco 
Nifedipine Retard Anti hypertensive 2 20 mg Kuwait, Morocco 
Pyrazinamide Antiinfectives 2 500 mg Morocco, Philippines 
Valproic Acid Epilepsy 2 200 mg Malaysia, Morocco 
Acetylsalicylic acid Anti-inflammatory 1 NA Morocco 
Amoxicillin Antibiotic 1 250 mg Jordan 
Benzathine benzylpenicillin Antibiotic 1 
 
1.2 MIU vial Morocco 
Cefradine Antibiotic 1 NA China 
Chloroquine Antimalarial 1 NA Tunisia 
10 
 
Cimetidine Antacid 1 NA China 
Digoxin Cardio therapy 1 0.25 mg Philippines 
Diltiazem 
Calcium channel 
blocker 1 
 
60 mg Jordan 
Enalapril Antihypertensive 1 20 mg Jordan 
Glibenclamide Diabetes 1 5 mg Philippines 
Gliclazide Diabetes 1 NA China 
Insulin neutral Diabetes 1 100 ml Kuwait 
Isosorbide dinitrate Cardio therapy 1 10 mg Philippines 
Itraconazole Antifungal 1 100 mg Malaysia 
Lisinopril Antihypertensive 1 10 mg Kuwait 
Medroxyprogesterone Contraceptive 1 150 mg Kazakhstan 
Methyldopa Antihypertensive 1 250 mg Jordan 
Paracetamol Anti-inflammatory 1 500 mg Syria 
Prazosin Antihypertensive 1 1 mg Malaysia 
Streptomycin Antibiotic 1 1 g vial Morocco 
     
Source: WHO/HAI 2006 
Note Due to lack of data, price elasticities could not be calculated for the following: Acetylsalicylic acid; Cefradine; Chloroquine; Cimetidine; and Glicazide”. 
Note: Data from China were sampled in two regions, which resulted in two observations for this country. The corresponding elasticities were calculated separately. 
 
As noted for estimation purposes, data on marginal costs were required, and these were unavailable 
for branded drugs. The closest proxy available was the price of the relevant generic drug in the 
market. The use of generic information as a proxy for marginal cost implies that all branded drugs 
studied were off-patent. For a small number of drugs even generic product data were unavailable, in 
which case the average international procurement price was used as a proxy. Information on these 
average prices was supplied from Management Science for Health (MSH). MSH maintains a 
database of international procurement prices offered by international suppliers to low-income 
countries. This dataset is a standard source of international procurement prices and is considered a 
gold standard (Russo et al. 2010). 
 
While the WHO/HAI survey attempted to collect price information on the same drug in each 
country, this was not always possible. A final total of 139 observations were therefore available for 
analysis.  In the data sample, the highest number of countries with the same drug was 7 for 
carbamazepine (treatment of epilepsy), and 6 for both ceftriaxone (antibiotic) and salbutamol 
(treatment of asthma)  
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Results 
 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Prices of medicines show significant variation by therapeutic class of drugs and even within 
therapeutic classes across countries. Medicines are typically available in pack (e.g. pack of 25 
tablets, 50, 100, etc.). Branded prices sold according to their packs ranged from US$ 325 
(fluconazole in Tunisia, and zidovudine and nevirapine in Lebanon) to less than a US$ 1. Antiviral 
drugs had the highest prices per pack while most antibiotics (except for ciproflaxin) were the least 
expensive for both branded and generics. Most medicines were priced at less than US$ 50 with 
Jordan and Kazakhstan having the lowest prices. The top prices of generics per pack ranged from 
US$ 162 (indinavir, zidovudine, nevirapine in Morocco, Malaysia and Lebanon) to less than US$ 1. 
Most medicines were priced less than US$ 10, with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan having the lowest 
prices.  
 
Price comparisons of medicines are difficult when pack sizes vary. Prices can be normalised by 
taking the unit price which allows for more straightforward comparisons. The wide variability in 
prices per pill was examined by calculating the standard error for each molecule. Figure 1 shows the 
standard error in prices by pill which reveals wide variations for certain antifungal and antibiotics 
drugs. A similar pattern was observed by pack size (not shown but available upon request).  
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Mark-ups were computed for each drug and averaged for each country. The data indicate that mark-
ups vary across the countries ranging from 50% to 100% with Peru (50%), Jordan (60%) having the 
lowest and South Africa, Philippines and Kyrgyzstan having the highest (90% to 100%) as shown in 
the Figure 2. Most countries have average mark-ups ranging between 70% and 80%. The system of 
pharmaceutical regulation in each country would provide further information to better understand 
price differences but is outside the scope of this paper. Unregulated mark-ups along the supply chain 
contribute to high retail prices of medicines in low-income countries (Levison and Laing 2003; 
WHO/HAI 2006). 
 
0
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Therapeutic category
Figure 1  - Standard error in prices per pill
Brand per pill Generic per pillSource: WHO/HAI 2006
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Price elasticity estimates 
 
Price elasticities were back-calculated using the Ramsey rule as shown in equation (2). Details are 
found in Table 2. Estimates of the price elasticities for different therapeutic products and countries 
range from between -1 to -2. These measures of elasticity suggest that if the procurement price of the 
drug increases by 10%, demand for the drug would drop by 10% to 20%. This implies that low-
income countries are elasticly responsive to changes in the prices of medicines and, assuming these 
estimates are a good first approximation, certainly more responsive than high-income countries.  
 
Table 2 - Elasticity results by molecule name 
Molecule name Therapeutic category Country Elasticity 
Brand pack price 
($US) 
Generic pack price 
($US) 
 
Pack 
size 
       
Aciclovir Antiviral Kazakhstan -1.3 17.5 3.9 25 
Aciclovir Antiviral Tunisia -1.1 25.0 2.4 25 
Aciclovir Antiviral Philippines -1.1 32.8 2.4 25 
Aciclovir Antiviral Syria -1.3 21.8 5.0 25 
Amitriptyline Antidepressant Jordan -1.4 2.6 0.8 100 
Amitriptyline Antidepressant Morocco -1.2 5.1 0.8 100 
Amitriptyline Antidepressant Lebanon -1.3 3.4 0.7 100 
Amlodipine Calcium channel blocker Malaysia -1.1 8.8 0.4 30 
Atenolol Antihypertensive Syria -1.4 5.9 1.7 60 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Kyrgyzstan
Philippines
South Africa
Lebanon
Kazakhstan
Tunisia
Shandong
Shanghai
Kuwait
Nigeria
Malaysia
Morocco
Pakistan
Syria
Jordan
Peru
Note Peru is based on one observation
Figure 2 - Average mark-ups across countries
Source: WHO/HAI 2006
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Atenolol Antihypertensive Philippines -1.0 7.4 0.3 28 
Beclometasone Asthma Peru -2.0 6.8 3.4 200 
Beclometasone Asthma Morocco -1.5 7.9 2.5 200 
Benzathine benzylpenicillin Antibiotic Morocco -1.4 2.2 0.6 4 
Captopril Antihypertensive Morocco -1.5 59.6 20.3 60 
Captopril Antihypertensive Malaysia -1.7 3.9 1.6 60 
Captopril Antihypertensive Kazakhstan -1.4 5.1 1.6 60 
Captopril Antihypertensive Pakistan -1.1 5.6 0.5 60 
Captopril Antihypertensive Philippines -1.1 56.2 4.0 150 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Kazakhstan -1.8 26.9 12.2 150 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Shanghai -1.2 13.1 2.0 100 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Shandong -1.2 12.5 2.0 100 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Philippines -1.1 115.1 10.0 500 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Kuwait -1.3 12.2 2.9 150 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Malaysia -1.5 6.4 2.0 100 
Carbamazepine Epilepsy Syria -1.4 20.2 5.5 150 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic South Africa -1.2 8.5 1.5 1 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Malaysia -1.7 6.1 2.6 1 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Kazakhstan -1.4 10.4 3.0 1 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Philippines -1.4 9.1 2.6 1 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Shanghai -1.1 10.2 0.7 1 
Ceftriaxone Antibiotic Shandong -1.0 12.5 0.4 1 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Kazakhstan -1.2 0.2 0.0 1 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Nigeria -1.3 0.9 0.2 1 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Morocco -1.6 2.1 0.8 1 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic Philippines -1.0 111.0 3.2 100 
Ciprofloxacin Antibiotic South Africa -1.1 0.7 0.0 1 
Co-trimoxazole Antibiotic Syria -1.5 0.8 0.3 70 
Co-trimoxazole Antibiotic Tunisia -1.2 1.9 0.3 70 
Diazepam Anxiolytic Tunisia -1.8 2.8 1.3 100 
Diazepam Anxiolytic Jordan -1.7 0.9 0.4 100 
Diazepam Anxiolytic Syria -1.4 3.9 1.2 100 
Diazepam Anxiolytic Morocco -1.1 3.8 0.4 100 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Shandong -1.7 9.3 4.0 100 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Syria -1.3 9.3 1.9 100 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Philippines -1.0 15.6 0.5 100 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Kazakhstan -1.1 27.1 2.1 100 
Diclofenac Anti-inflammatory Morocco -1.1 9.7 0.5 100 
Digoxin Cardio therapy Philippines -1.1 28.5 3.3 500 
Fluconazole Antifungal South Africa -1.1 107.7 12.3 30 
Fluconazole Antifungal Tunisia -1.0 325.9 3.6 30 
Fluconazole Antifungal Jordan -1.8 0.2 0.1 1 
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Malaysia -1.0 27.5 0.9 30 
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Shandong -1.4 34.6 10.5 30 
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Shanghai -1.7 35.1 14.3 30 
Fluoxetine Antidepressant Philippines -1.0 49.7 0.8 28 
Fluphenazine Antipsychotic Morocco -1.4 1.8 0.5 1 
Fluphenazine Antipsychotic Jordan -2.0 1.0 0.5 1 
Furosemide Diueretic Philippines -1.0 3.5 0.1 28 
Furosemide Diueretic Jordan -2.0 0.2 0.1 20 
Glibenclamide Diabetes Philippines -1.1 14.6 0.8 200 
Indinavir Antiviral Morocco -1.9 133.4 62.6 180 
Loratadine Antihistamine Syria -1.3 4.2 1.0 20 
Loratadine Antihistamine Malaysia -1.1 2.4 0.2 10 
Mebendazole Antiparasitic Kazakhstan -1.0 1.3 0.0 6 
Mebendazole Antiparasitic Kyrgyzstan -1.0 1.5 0.0 6 
Medroxyprogesterone Contraceptive Kazakhstan -1.2 7.4 1.0 1 
15 
 
Metformin Diabetes Nigeria -1.2 7.1 1.4 100 
Metformin Diabetes Pakistan -1.6 1.7 0.7 100 
Metformin Diabetes Shanghai -1.2 15.3 2.8 100 
Metformin Diabetes Philippines -1.2 11.0 1.8 100 
Metronidazole Antiparasitic Syria -1.9 0.8 0.4 20 
Metronidazole Antiparasitic Philippines -1.0 24.5 0.4 100 
Nevirapine Antiviral Lebanon -1.2 197.8 31.0 60 
Nevirapine Antiviral Morocco -1.2 72.3 14.1 60 
Nifedipine Retard Anti hypertensive Morocco -1.1 41.2 2.2 100 
Nifedipine Retard Anti hypertensive Kuwait -1.3 11.9 2.4 100 
Omeprazole Antacid Shandong -1.1 39.1 3.6 30 
Omeprazole Antacid Shanghai -1.3 39.2 8.5 30 
Paracetamol Anti-inflammatory Syria -1.3 1.1 0.2 20 
Phenytoin Epilepsy Lebanon -1.2 4.1 0.7 100 
Phenytoin Epilepsy Kuwait -1.2 3.7 0.7 100 
Phenytoin Epilepsy Jordan -1.2 4.6 0.7 100 
Phenytoin Epilepsy Tunisia -1.3 3.2 0.7 100 
Ranitidine Antacid Philippines -1.1 23.0 1.2 50 
Ranitidine Antacid Kazakhstan -1.1 11.7 1.5 60 
Ranitidine Antacid Syria -1.3 9.5 2.4 60 
Simvastatin Lipid lowering Malaysia -1.1 104.2 10.0 120 
Streptomycin Antibiotic Morocco -1.4 0.4 0.1 1 
Zidovudine Antiviral Lebanon -1.1 296.0 18.6 150 
Zidovudine Antiviral Malaysia -1.9 78.8 37.5 100 
       
Source: WHO/HAI 2006 
 
 
Figure 3 displays the across country estimates. Similar results show that across drugs, estimates are 
also fairly consistent. The outliers appear random, which suggests no systematic bias in the results, 
either by country or by drug. 
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Out of 139 observations, 49 further estimates were dropped for two reasons. In the first case, 
observations where the branded price was below the generic price back-calculation of elasticity was 
not possible (19 observations were dropped). Second, a number of implausible estimates of price 
elasticities ranging between -3 and -27 (30 observations) arose, where the branded and generic pack 
price were relatively similar in value; probably indicating that at least in these cases the generic price 
was not a reasonable approximation to marginal cost.  While this is not an insignificant reduction in 
the sample size, the pattern and range of elasticities remained consistent across drugs and across 
countries. 
 
Sensitivity analysis was carried out on the results. First, generic prices, which were used as proxies 
for marginal cost, were varied to see if the results would significantly change the results. Prices of 
generic drugs were increased and decreased by 5% and 10%. The results showed that estimates 
stayed within the original range with very few changes in the country and drug specific results. 
 
Income correlation 
 
Correlations were calculated between price and measures of income: Gross domestic product (GDP) 
per capita, and gross national income (GNI) per capita.  The analysis also extended the calculations 
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to test for correlations between price and health care expenditure to assess whether prices had some 
relationship with the level of health expenditure in the country and are shown in Table 3. Three 
expenditure measures were used: per capita public health expenditure (PHE); total health expenditure 
(THE) as a % of GDP; and per capital total health expenditure. 
 
Table 3 - Correlations between price and income, price and expenditure 
 GDP per capita GNI per capita PHE per capita THE % GDP THE per capita 
      
Pack price -0.000 -0.011 0.066 0.120 0.215 
Price per pill 0.007 -0.004 0.008 -0.022 0.050 
       
Source: WHO/HAI 2006; World Bank Development Indicators 2005 
 
The results suggest little relationship with income measures: -0.01 to 0.007 (GDP); -0.011 to -0.004 
(GNI) and a weak relationship with expenditure measures (0.008 to 0.2). This result is not consistent 
with some findings where a positive association between a country’s income and price was found 
(Schut et al. 1986; Scherer and Watal 2001), but is consistent with a recent study by Morel et al 
(2011), which might suggest a change in recent global pricing practices. A small positive relationship 
between government health expenditure and the price of the drug was also found. This implies that 
higher government expenditure on health is related to having higher priced drugs. These results have 
intuitive appeal and are consistent with the general findings in the literature (WHO 2004a).  
 
Limitations  
 
While the study was initiated to attempt to estimate a wide range of pharmaceutical product price 
elasticities in low-income countries where data, especially on volumes, is often limited the 
limitations of the study should be noted. The analytical approach assumes that firms pay some 
attention, at least implicitly, to the Ramsey pricing rule, but of course this may not be the case. 
Second, the results assume that the proxy used for marginal cost, generic prices or international 
procurement prices are reliable measures. In fact a number of observations had to be excluded from 
the analysis where the use of the proxy returned inadmissible estimates.  Further, not all prices 
gained from the survey reflect true government procurement prices. As noted, a small minority of 
cases drew on data from government operated hospitals. Furthermore, elasticities were calculated 
using standardised pack sizes which may not necessarily be representative of pack sizes in each 
country. 
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Nevertheless, this study is an exploratory exercise and the adopted analytical approach ought to be 
viewed against the substantial data constraints faced in estimating demand curves for pharmaceutical 
products in low-income countries because. Even indirect methods of estimation prove useful in 
returning empirical estimates of demand responsiveness were severe data constraints exist. Yet the 
estimates should be taken as indicative rather than authoritative. 
 
Conclusion and policy implications 
 
The aim of this paper was to better understand the pattern of pharmaceutical prices across countries 
and country price responsiveness. The findings indicate that price elasticities at the government level 
range between –1 and –2 across all therapeutic classes studied. Sensitivity tests found that the results 
stayed within this range. While the technique required a number of assumptions to undertake a back-
calculation to overcome data restrictions on product volumes, these estimates are a first attempt at 
better understanding demand structures in these settings and are therefore the result of an analytical 
exercise and the results should be viewed as suggestive. 
 
That said the evidence presented here suggests that the price response of low-income countries to 
pharmaceutical price, when the product is centrally procured, is robustly elastic. Moreover there 
seems little relationship with a countries income, although some correlation with health care 
expenditure levels. Taken together this evidence would suggest that if pharmaceutical manufacturers 
do not price discriminate on the basis of ability to pay, low-income countries will face market access 
restrictions to new products where the global pharmaceutical policy is aimed to recover high R&D 
costs. 
 
Possibly as a response to market access restrictions, explicit pricing policies are not common place in 
low-income countries. Such policies are involved and incur administration costs (WHO 2004b). A 
WHO report noted that such costs contribute to the low uptake of adopting pricing policies with only 
half of all low-income countries having any pricing policy in place (WHO 2004b). Of course the 
implementation of pricing policies requires the use of reliable data and it is imperative that 
procurement agencies begin the task of collecting reliable data on both price and volume in the 
pharmaceutical sector—international bodies already involved in procurement for low-income 
countries could play a key role. Without such data policy objectives cannot be implemented or 
assessed. 
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As noted by this study information on volume would provide better estimates of price elasticities. A 
properly devised longitudinal study would allow for the analysis of patterns in the demand for 
medicines over time. Data collection relating to regulatory and supply issues would provide insight 
in the policy implications of pricing and reimbursement and licensing decisions. In some settings 
government procurement could play a small role in medicine access relative to non-governmental 
bodies and would shed light on the interaction between these actors (Russo et al. 2010; Seiter 2010; 
Waning et al 2010, Wirtz et al 2009). Recent efforts by the WHO/HAI, Access to Medicines index, 
Medicines Transparency Alliance (MeTA) signal an important priority shift in this area. As this 
study has shown, access to medicines is a pressing yet complex public health issue. Research in this 
area is needed in order to continue to build evidence to inform the design of effective pharmaceutical 
policy and to contribute to improving access to medicines for people in low-income countries. 
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